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This paper evaluates the effect of an anti-poverty program, Chile Solidario, 
during its first two years of operation. We find that the program tends to in-
creases significantly their take-up of cash assistance programs and of social 
programs for housing and employment, and to improve education and health 
outcomes for participating households. There is no evidence that the participa-
tion to employment program translates into improved employment or income 
outcomes in the short term. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence of the key 
role that the psycho-social support had in enabling this change, by increasing 
awareness of social services in the community as well as households’ orienta-
tion towards the future.
Key words: Program evaluation, Matching estimators, Extreme poverty, 
Chile.
Resumen
En este estudio se evalúa el efecto de un programa de lucha contra la pobreza, 
Chile Solidario, durante sus primeros dos años de funcionamiento. Encontramos 
que el programa tiende a aumentar significativamente su asimilación para los 
programas de asistencia en efectivo y los programas de vivienda sociales y 
empleo, así como a mejorar los resultados de la educación y la salud de los 
hogares participantes. No hay evidencia de que la participación en programas 
de empleo se traduzca en mejoras en el empleo o los ingresos en el corto plazo. Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 102
Finalmente, la evidencia sugiere que el apoyo psicosocial ha tenido un rol fun-
damental en generar este cambio, tanto por medio de aumentar el conocimiento 
acerca de los servicios sociales en la comunidad como a través de la orientación 
de los hogares hacia el futuro.
Palabras clave: Evaluación de programas, Estimadores de “matching”, Pobreza 
extrema, Chile.
JEL Classification: c14, c51, I31, I38, O15.
“We cannot be content, when we know that 6% of the population lives 
in conditions of indigence. (…) We are going to go where they live. We 
want not only to provide subsidies, we want their children to study, to 
have health assistance, and we want to include them into social net-
works and into the society in its entirety. We are going to build a bridge 
between them and their rights, so that they can exercise them to defeat 
their conditions of extreme poverty”.
Ricardo Lagos, President of the Republic of Chile. Presidential address, 
May 2002.
1.  Introduction
The perception that poverty is associated with social exclusion is subject of 
public debate in many countries. There is a general agreement that household in 
extreme poverty are deprived along multiple dimensions, which reinforce each 
other to jointly lock them into indigence. Yet there are very few examples of 
policy interventions that take this multi-dimensionality seriously, so as to help 
the extreme poor to escape deprivation in a sustained way by simultaneously 
addressing different structural constraints.
An important exception approach might come from a new program aimed 
at tackling extreme poverty in Chile. The country has experienced years of 
sustained income growth during the 1990s, with an average per capita GDP 
growth of 4.5 per cent between 1990 and 2002. As a result, in the context of a 
stable income distribution (Ferreira and Litchfield, 1999),1 economic growth 
has translated into a reduction in the incidence of overall poverty in the country 
(from 33 per cent to around 15 per cent), but without much changes in extreme 
poverty (stable at around 5.6 per cent) over the same period (World Bank, 
2001). The benefits from growth did not trickle down to the poorest segments 
of the population despite a large array of social services, targeted to the poor.2 
1  Between 1987 and 1994, the shape of the income distribution has only slightly changed, 
with a small compression at the bottom and a small increase in the upper tail (Ferreira 
and Litchfield, 1999; Litchfield, 2001).
2  As of 1998, the first five ventiles of household income were receiving 54% of all cash 
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The poorest segments are often unaware of their eligibility to certain programs 
or do not know how to activate the process of accessing them. As a response, 
the government of Chile has proactively introduced in 2002 a program, Chile 
Solidario, which aims reaching households in ‘indigence’ in the country with 
an approach that goes beyond improving the targeting performance of public 
programs or simply providing recipients with cash assistance.
The first component of the program reaches households in extreme poverty 
(through a proxy means testing) and provides them with a two year period of 
psycho-social support through a local social worker. During this period, the 
social worker works with the household to assess their needs and to help them 
devise a strategy to exit extreme poverty in the short run, by providing direct 
cash transfers at a decreasing rate over time and by connecting households to 
various social programs. After the two year intensive period, households are 
ensured a direct cash transfer and preferential access to assistance programs 
for an additional period of three years. At the same time, the program aims at 
helping households to progressively sustain their exit from extreme poverty in 
the long run by improving their human capital assets, their housing and their 
income generation capacity.
The second component works on the supply side, by ensuring coordination 
among different programs. The rational comes from the recognition that an 
approach with isolated and sectoral programs does not lend itself to face the 
multiple and interrelated material as well as psycho-emotional deprivation of the 
extreme poor. The objective in the long term is to move away from an approach 
based on single programs towards a “system” of social protection, where the 
supply side provides bundles of programs that are tailored to meet the specific 
needs of households that are hard to reach.
The program scaled up and expanded a pilot program called Puente, previously 
operating in 4 provinces. The program was phased in four waves, from 2002 to 
2005 to cover a target population of 225,000 households, the estimated number 
of households in indigence in the country. The program has subsequently evolved 
to become a building block of the system of social protection in the country. 
Even though the primary objective is to alleviate extreme poverty, over time it 
added a complementary social protection focus, with the objective of protecting 
households from falling back into poverty when faced by uninsured risk.
This document summarizes the results of the first quantitative short term 
evaluation of the program (Galasso, 2006). The data used in this paper for the 
purpose of the evaluation uses a subset of participating households and matched 
non-participants interviewed in the nationwide socio-economic survey (CASEN) 
in 2003 and followed up longitudinally in 2004. The results of the evaluation 
cover only the short term impact for the first cohorts of beneficiaries up to 2004, 
the majority of whom are still part of the two-year phase of psycho-social sup-
port by the social worker.
The scope for identification comes from the design features of the program. 
The program assignment is based on a proxy-means score (CAS), related to 
unsatisfied basic needs. In the empirical analysis, we will exploit the exogenous 
geographic variation in the distribution of the CAS score, as well as in eligibility 
to estimate the effect of the program on a wide array of outcomes.
The results from the first two years of intervention of the program show gains 
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school for 6-15, adult literacy) and milder effects on health outcomes (enrolment 
in the public health system, as well as preventive health visits for children under 
6 and women). The results show also a strong take-up of employment programs, 
though this participation is not (yet) translated into employment effects. There 
are no significant effects on household income per capita, though participating 
households are significantly more likely to be receiving social assistance transfers. 
There is also evidence that on average Chile Solidario participants have increased 
their awareness of social services in the community and are more likely to be 
more optimistic about their future socio-economic situation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start in section 2 with a detailed 
description of the Chile Solidario program and its assignment mechanism. 
Section 3 presents the methodology we apply, and discuss the identification 
assumptions. Section 4 describes the data and section 5 presents the results. 
Concluding comments will be provided in section 6.
2.  Background on the Program
The objective of alleviating extreme poverty is achieved through a two-pronged 
strategy, working on both the demand and the supply side of public services.
The first component of Chile Solidario provides participating households 
with a two year period of psycho-social support implemented through the 
outreach activities of a local social worker. The social worker has a dual role 
of helping households to create or restore their basic capabilities and functions 
and helping them to create links and get ‘connected’ to a local network of social 
services. He/she conveys information and represents a catalyst for households to 
elicit unexpressed demand for those public programs that meet their needs. The 
psycho-social support has been recognized by law as an integral component of 
the intervention and represents the key distinctive feature of this approach.
The multidimensional aspect of deprivation is operationalized in terms of 
a set of “minimum conditions”, which aim at measuring a minimally accept-
able level of well-being along different dimensions or pillars (identification/
legal documentation, family dynamics, education, health, housing, employment, 
income). During this intensive phase, each family works with the worker to get 
familiarized with the minimum conditions, and identifies the key priority areas 
to work on during the intervention. The families then commit to put their effort 
in meeting those unmet priority conditions, by signing ‘partial contracts’ with 
the social worker.
The program includes also a small cash transfer (‘bono de protección’), 
which is transferred to participating households after having signed their partial 
contracts. The ‘bono’’s value is tapered over time, with the idea that households 
should progressively improve their standards of living as a result of the pro-
gram.3 The short-term income support in the case of Chile Solidario besides the 
3  The direct transfer is set at Ch$ 10,500 per month for the first six months of the Puente 
program; decreases to Ch$ 8,000 in the second six months of the program. In the second 
year it decreases to Ch$ 5,500 and finally to Ch$ 3,500 for the last six months, an amount 
equivalent to the family allowance (SUF), one of the main cash assistance transfers.Alleviating extreme poverty in Chile… / Emanuela Galasso 105
‘bono’ takes the form of accessing existing cash assistance program to which 
participating households were already eligible to. The transfer is not conditional 
on any behavioral requirement on school enrolment or health visits, though it 
is terminated if households interrupt their participation to the program.4 The 
conditionality relates to the partial contracts that households signed during the 
intensive phase: households are expected to show efforts in working on those 
conditions that are recognized by the family itself as structural bottlenecks 
and to which they have committed to. After the two years of psycho-social 
support, households receive an unconditional exit bonus (‘bono de egreso’) 
for additional three years, of an amount comparable to the last transfer of the 
‘bono de proteccion’.
The underlying rational for Puente and Chile Solidario was the realiza-
tion that households in indigence were unable to formulate and activate their 
demand for social services, due to constraints to take-up that have been well 
documented in the US labor literature (Currie, 2004), such as information, feel-
ing of helplessness and discrimination. The social worker conveys information 
and helps the households activate their demand for those public programs that 
meet their needs.
At the same time the social worker assists the households in realizing what 
their needs and priorities are helps them devise a strategy (their ‘life-time proj-
ect’), by developing a set of endowments (assets, skills, abilities, information, 
autonomy and self-efficacy) that allow them to autonomously sustain their exit 
from extreme poverty in the long-run.
The second component of the intervention focuses on strengthening the 
supply side of public services. Public programs and services were previously 
available for their respective eligible population upon demand. Chile Solidario 
works directly with the municipalities, which are the local providers of public 
services, by making sure that the supply side is locally organized to attend the 
needs of this specific target population and ‘bridge’ the demand gap. This process 
is facilitated by the fact that the activities of the social workers are institutionally 
grounded in each municipality (UIF, Unidad de Intervención Familiar). Their 
work and performance is supervised and coordinated by a municipal employee 
(head of the UIF). Until 2004, the social workers had to work with the existing 
supply of social services within the municipalities, and the supply component of 
the program worked mainly through facilitating the coordination and network-
ing of the different actors. The supply side response in terms of volume, size 
and targeting performance of new programs was activated after 2004, which is 
outside the scope of the current analysis.
4  The drop-out rate is estimated to be very low, around 3 per cent of all the households 
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3.  Methodology
3.1.  The assignment mechanism
Impact is defined as the change in the outcome of interest that can be 
causally attributed to the program. It is important to bear in mind that the 
program CHS is targeted to households in extreme poverty. As a consequence, 
differences in outcomes between participants and non-participants could be 
attributed either to differences in initial conditions (such as their educational 
attainment, or ethnicity) or to non-observable characteristics (such as motiva-
tion or ability).
As in other examples of social programs and conditional cash transfers 
programs in developing countries, the program is assigned on the basis of a 
proxy-means score calculated on the basis of a card (CAS ficha).5 All house-
holds whose scores are below a predetermined threshold are considered 
eligible to participate. In order to ensure a wide geographical coverage of the 
program, a decision was made to allow thresholds to vary across communes 
and regions, with the aim of reflecting differences in the poverty rates across 
different geographic areas. Households within municipalities are sequentially 
invited to participate to the program, by starting from the bottom up of their 
CAS distribution.6
These design features are such that two potentially eligible and observa-
tionally equivalent households can have been differentially exposed to the 
program.
The results reported in this document use the method of matching to esti-
mate the counterfactual of no-program outcomes and estimate the impact of the 
program. This method estimates the counterfactual of no-program outcomes by 
matching on the observable characteristics used in practice during the assign-
ment mechanism, i.e. the CAS score. Households are assigned according to the 
CAS. Households are assigned to participate in strict ordering depending on 
their score. Moreover, given that households are invited to participate, they are 
assumed not to self-select into the program based on the expected gains. In this 
setting, participation (‘treatment’ in the evaluation literature), is assumed to be 
independent of the outcomes of interest, conditional on the score.
We follow Abadie and Imbens (2006) to estimate the effect of the program 
on participants, by matching on the CAS score (more methodological details are 
5  The score is a summary index of unsatisfied basic needs that is used as pre-requisite for 
participation to Chile Solidario and a wide-array of other social programs in Chile, from 
income transfers (e.g. family allowance SUF, old age public pension PASIS) as well as 
subsidies to health utilization(FONASA), water subsidies SAP, access to public housing 
and childcare centers. 
6  Even though in principle households could refuse the invitation to participate, in practice, 
the proportion of households who refused to is too small to meaningfully model the selec-
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available in Galasso, 2006). We also estimate the effect by matching on the CAS 
score and adjusting the difference within the matches in their covariates.7 We 
perform separate estimations for rural and urban areas: the incidence of poverty,8 
the infrastructure, the supply side of public services and the labor markets faced 
by households living in rural and urban areas are very different.
Note that this identification strategy compares participating and non-
participating households with similar scores (and household characteristics). 
One potential concern is that it assumes that the effect of the treatment does 
not vary across regions and/or municipalities, which might be a strong as-
sumption in the context of the program, which gives such an important role 
to municipalities. Different municipalities might face a different supply of 
social services. We address these concerns by presenting the results with an 
additional specification where we allow for community effects, in addition 
to household characteristics. This will control for any time-invariant differ-
ences in the initial conditions of the supply side, as well as for unobserved 
characteristics of the local labor market.9
An alternative identification strategy would rely on the exogenous variation in 
the thresholds for eligibility. The method of regression discontinuity design (van 
der Klaaw (2002) and Chay, McEwan, and Urquiola (2005)) allows to estimate 
the effect the program by comparing a large set of outcomes for households 
just above and below the cutoffs. However, given that municipalities started 
from the bottom-up of their CAS distribution, the bulk of the distribution of 
participants for the first cohorts is concentrated to the left of the graph, away 
from the cut-offs. For this reason, the application of this alternative method is 
deemed to be more relevant to subsequent cohorts, as it would allow making 
inferences applicable to a larger share of the target population (see Carneiro, 
Galasso and Ginja (2009)).
4.  Data
In order to document the evolution of impact of the program over time, 
the evaluation was implemented through a longitudinal survey (planned at 
7  The bias-correction introduced by Abadie and Imbens (2006) removes the conditional 
bias that arises when matching is performed on more than two variables are used. In our 
framework, only one matching variable is used (i.e. the CAS score). We use their approach 
to estimate the conditional treatment effect on the treated.
8  The incidence of rural poverty was found to be double the incidence of urban poverty in 
1987, although the differences across urban and rural areas have converged over time, 
especially for the incidence of extreme poverty (Litchfield, 2001). 
9  The underlying assumption behind this specification is that the supply side is given at 
any given point in time. The assumption seems relevant in the first two years of opera-
tion of the program. Over time, to the extent that the supply side responds differentially 
depending on the local unsatisfied demand, this approach will need to be modified to 
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one year intervals between 2003 and 2007). The longitudinal survey identi-
fies a sample of participants and comparable non-participants identified from 
the the nationally representative household survey –the Caracterización 
Socioeconómica Nacional –CASEN– in 2003. The survey is multi-topic, 
ranging from questions on demographics, employment, income, education, 
health status and utilization of services to access to public subsidies and 
transfers. MIDEPLAN, the ministry in charge of the survey as well as of the 
program, planned to add questions on program participation to the CASEN 
administered in 2003. The sample size has been augmented to over-sample 
Chile Solidario beneficiaries.
In Tables 1 we report weighted means for demographic, socio-economic 
characteristics, household income and intermediate indicators used in the analysis. 
The descriptive statistics (Table 1a) confirm that program has indeed been well 
targeted. Participants households come from larger households, where both the 
head and the spouse have lower educational attainments (about 2/3 have not 
completed primary education), have lower labor force attachment, and lower 
assets (durables). They are also more likely to come from rural areas, and from 
ethnic minorities. Participants are twice more likely than non-participants to 
have at least one member with disabilities.
In order to allow for the possibility of following up the impact of the pro-
gram over time, while keeping low the survey cost, MIDEPLAN agreed to 
interviewed only a subset of participants together their ‘matched’ comparison 
one year apart (November 2004). Two subsequent rounds of the longitudinal 
survey (2006 and 2007) were collected to eventually form a four-year longi-
tudinal panel.
The 2004 questionnaire has newly added questions on participation to 
various social programs. It has also new modules on intergenerational mobility 
(with questions on the education and background of the parents), subjective 
welfare, as well as a short module on perceptions (problem solving, perceived 
social support and expectations about the future). The descriptive statistics, by 
participation status, on the intergenerational and the perception questions are 
suggestive. These underlying differences in the socio-economic conditions of 
participants and non-participants are also reflected in their subjective measures 
of well-being, with more than 2/3 of the participants whom consider themselves 
to belong to the lower ladder of socio-economic well-being compared to 1/2 of 
the non-participants.
Finally, our identification strategy requires that we observe the actual CAS 
(proxy-means) score used to select households into the program. 2004 panel 
sample for the rest of the analysis. As shown in Figure 2, the distribution of 
CAS scores for participation is strictly to the left of that of non-participants. 
Participants are much more likely to be eligible (having their CAS below the 
relevant threshold). Next section will provide the results obtained by applying 
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TABLE 1A











mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
Rural area 0.130 0.337  0.307 0.461
Hh’ld income p.c.* 128,927 304,879 33,330 30,789
Hh’ld ‘ingreso autónomo’ p.c. 
(excl. public transfers)* 125,925 304,494 27,945 30,519
Hh’ld ‘ingreso autónomo’ p.c. 
[adjusted]  171,010 439,221 38,339 51,926
Durables: refrigerator 0.864 0.343 0.470 0.499
Durables: calefont 0.626 0.484 0.088 0.283
Household size 3.744 1.749 4.716 2.083
Presence disabled member 0.135 0.397 0.251 0.531
male 0.739 0.439 0.665 0.472 0.134 0.341
age 49.52 15.27 47.55 15.39 42.20 14.78
age<30 0.098 0.297 0.125 0.331 0.243 0.429
Education level:
no education 0.033 0.180 0.124 0.330 0.106 0.308
Incomplete primary 0.203 0.403 0.515 0.500 0.511 0.500
complete primary 0.139 0.346 0.176 0.381 0.170 0.376
Incomplete secondary 0.181 0.385 0.119 0.324
Complete secondary 0.234 0.423 0.054 0.226
Higher education 0.205 0.403 0.008 0.088
Marital status:
married 0.579 0.494 0.445 0.497 0.411 0.492
union 0.128 0.334 0.247 0.431 0.272 0.445
single 0.101 0.301 0.108 0.311 0.147 0.355
Employment status:
employed in 2000 0.714 0.452 0.619 0.486 0.295 0.456
housework in 2000 0.086 0.281 0.172 0.378 0.581 0.493
unemployed in 2000 0.038 0.192 0.070 0.256 0.037 0.190
currently employed 0.718 0.450 0.620 0.486 0.365 0.481
currently unemployed 0.041 0.199 0.079 0.269 0.054 0.226
currently inactive 0.241 0.428 0.302 0.459 0.580 0.494





No.obs 65,628 5,608 5,360
Note:  Own calculation from the CASEN 2003 survey. Variables are weighted using sampling 
weights. (*) Income figures are not adjusted, i.e. without the application of the CEPAL 
correction. Hh’ld ‘ingreso autonomo’ p.c. (adjusted) is used by MIDEPLAN to calculate 
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TABLE 1B















Mean st.dev. Mean st.dev Mean st.dev. mean st.dev
Demographics
household size 4.756 1.995 4.340 1.900 0.276 4.748 2.123 4.305 1.920
Share hh’ld members 0-5 0.123 0.146 0.091 0.136 0.232 0.112 0.139 0.084 0.131
Share hh’ld members 6-17 0.267 0.198 0.233 0.206 0.161 0.271 0.201 0.232 0.207
Share hh’ld members 18-64 0.543 0.205 0.577 0.238 –0.144 0.544 0.209 0.575 0.244
Share hh’ld members 65+ 0.067 0.168 0.098 0.230 –0.133 0.073 0.177 0.109 0.244
presence disabled member 0.252 0.536 0.203 0.493 0.106 0.267 0.567 0.199 0.475
both parents present 0.694 0.461 0.713 0.453 –0.038 0.662 0.473 0.698 0.459
head is male 0.663 0.473 0.710 0.454 –0.098 0.633 0.482 0.696 0.460
head is married 0.448 0.497 0.559 0.497 –0.214 0.405 0.491 0.544 0.498
ethnic minority 0.105 0.306 0.076 0.266 0.101 0.133 0.340 0.082 0.275
age head<30 0.134 0.340 0.086 0.280 0.134 0.108 0.310 0.070 0.255
age head (30, 40) 0.279 0.449 0.243 0.429 0.056 0.266 0.442 0.224 0.417
age head (40, 50) 0.228 0.419 0.257 0.437 –0.060 0.238 0.426 0.268 0.443
age spouse <30 0.168 0.374 0.115 0.319 0.144 0.133 0.339 0.097 0.296
age spouse (30, 40) 0.221 0.415 0.217 0.412 0.009 0.218 0.413 0.201 0.401
age spouse (40, 50) 0.151 0.358 0.184 0.387 –0.079 0.153 0.360 0.190 0.392
rural area 0.211 0.408 0.152 0.359 0.177 0.230 0.421 0.149 0.356
Family background
head - no education 0.125 0.331 0.056 0.231 0.253 0.127 0.333 0.053 0.223
head - incomplete primary 0.522 0.500 0.334 0.472 0.376 0.528 0.499 0.344 0.475
Spouse - no education 0.049 0.216 0.032 0.176 0.097 0.048 0.213 0.029 0.167
Spouse - incomplete primary 0.334 0.472 0.215 0.411 0.245 0.348 0.476 0.206 0.405
durables: refrigerator 0.493 0.500 0.778 0.416 –0.584 0.475 0.499 0.788 0.409
durables: calefont 0.080 0.271 0.374 0.484 –0.714 0.066 0.248 0.364 0.481
CAS score 466.32 27.61 540.31 48.33 –1.396
=1 if CAS score is missing 0.128 0.335 0.450 0.497 –0.689
Eligibility (CAS<CAS cutoff) 0.953 0.211 0.114 0.352 1.620
Housing
No. rooms 3.09 1.36 3.54 1.14 –0.345 3.07 1.21 3.49 1.10
Water: public network 0.810 0.392 0.910 0.286 –0.302 0.838 0.368 0.921 0.269
Sewage: public network 0.500 0.500 0.826 0.379 –0.665 0.490 0.500 0.832 0.374
Walls: concrete, breaks 0.164 0.370 0.441 0.497 –0.626 0.199 0.399 0.455 0.498
Ownership: own house 0.439 0.496 0.658 0.474 –0.386 0.461 0.499 0.662 0.473
Ownership: rented house 0.081 0.273 0.096 0.295 –0.109 0.077 0.266 0.092 0.289
Roof conditions: interior ceiling 0.544 0.498 0.837 0.369 –0.617 0.572 0.495 0.818 0.386
OUTCOMES:
Household Income (*)
Hh’ld income p.c. 31,175 23,596 51,843 41,282 33,155  25,060  55,913  52,358 
Hh’ld labor income p.c. 21,337 21,411 39,458 40,078 23,144  24,132  41,945  48,632 
Hh’ld non labor income p.c. 1,814 8,692 3,201 11,763 1,252  5,030  3,484  18,717 
Hh’ld public transfers p.c. 8,023 10,559 9,185 17,445 8,759  11,752 10,483  22,987 
Hh’ld ‘ingreso autónomo’ p.c. (excl. 
public transfers)
25,747 23,433 49,803 41,967 27,111 25,071 53,635 52,981
Intermediate indicators
if disabled: enrolled in Nat. Registry 0.273 0.446 0.296 0.457 0.299 0.458 0.240 0.427














Mean st.dev. Mean st.dev Mean st.dev. mean st.dev
OUTCOMES (cont.)
Health (unconditional):                
inscribed in SAPS (public system)  0.983 0.129 0.914 0.280 0.987 0.113 0.933 0.250
pregnant women w/regular check-up 0.044 0.204 0.036 0.185 0.045 0.208 0.035 0.184
all children<6 w/regular check-ups 0.211 0.408 0.163 0.370 0.168 0.374 0.152 0.359
all women>35 w/regular pap smear 0.385 0.487 0.384 0.486 0.424 0.494 0.411 0.492
all elderly w/regular check-up 0.077 0.267 0.100 0.299 0.082 0.275 0.117 0.321
Education (unconditional):        
all children 4-5 attending pre-school 0.169 0.374 0.110 0.313 0.153 0.360 0.109 0.311
All children<15 enrolled in school 0.674 0.469 0.582 0.493 0.652 0.476 0.575 0.494
children in school receiving assistance 0.559 0.497 0.481 0.500 0.530 0.499 0.471 0.499
all children 12-18 can read/write 0.166 0.372 0.158 0.365 0.165 0.371 0.176 0.381
all adults can read/write 0.704 0.457 0.855 0.352 0.678 0.467 0.853 0.354
adults enrolled in adult literacy pgm/
nivelación competencia
0.114 0.318 0.064 0.244 0.067 0.250 0.041 0.198
Employment:
at least one member working 0.835 0.371 0.874 0.332 0.831 0.374 0.886 0.318
Children 8-15 not in school&working 0.0008 0.031 0.0001 0.013 0.0001 0.000 0.0008 0.029
at least one member with stable job+ 0.751 0.433 0.867 0.339
at least one member enrolled in micro-
emprendimiento pgm+
0.306 0.461 0.027 0.161
at least one member enrolled in emplo-
yment programs+
0.096 0.295 0.040 0.195
at least one member enrolled in the 
local employment office+
0.459 0.498 0.231 0.422
at least one member enrolled in a 
training program+
0.182 0.386 0.166 0.372
Income:
hh’ld receiving SUF 0.606 0.489 0.187 0.390 0.639 0.480 0.189 0.391
hh’ld receiving asignación familiar 0.116 0.320 0.291 0.454 0.117 0.322 0.285 0.452
hh’ld receving PASIS 0.115 0.319 0.061 0.238 0.124 0.330 0.071 0.257
Housing:
hh’ld receving SAP  0.131 0.337 0.199 0.400 0.110 0.313 0.176 0.381
received material to protect house from 
rain/cold+
0.248 0.432 0.045 0.207
received equipment for kitchen/
bedroom+
0.233 0.423 0.013 0.113
hh’ld applying for public housing 0.329 0.470 0.241 0.428 0.373 0.484 0.230 0.421
No. Obs. 3,495 9,509 3,495 9,509
Note: Own calculation from the longitudinal sample CASEN 2003-Encuesta Panel 2004. Variables 
are weighted using sampling weights. The column “diff. std. means” reports the difference 
in means of the variables between the beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, after they 
have been normalized to have mean zero and unit variance.
(*)  Income figures are not adjusted, i.e. without the application of the CEPAL correction.
(+)  indicates that the variable available only in 2004.
  The summary statistics for the intermediate indicators are calculated on the entire sample, 
irrespectively of whether the indicator applies to the population of interest (ex. Having children 
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TABLE 1C
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON PERCEPTION qUESTIONS+, PANEL SAMPLE 2004







Mean st.dev. Mean st.dev. Mean st.dev. Mean st.dev.
“Situación económica 
en su infancia mejor” 0.398 0.49 0.349 0.477 0.359 0.48 0.336 0.472
Subjective welfare scale 
(5 ladder):
–“pertenece al grupo 
socioeconómico bajo” 0.704 0.456 0.479 0.499 0.655 0.475 0.400 0.489
–“pertenece al grupo 
socioeconómico medio-
bajo” 0.230 0.421 0.343 0.474 0.273 0.445 0.397 0.489
“Hizo algún trabajo 
por la comunidad - 2 
últimos años” 0.251 0.434 0.197 0.398 0.238 0.426 0.206 0.404
“Nadie lo ayudaría a 
solucionar su problema, 
si tuviera un problema 
importante” (social 
support) 0.165 0.371 0.162 0.369 0.153 0.360 0.156 0.362
“Situación económica 
en el futuro mejor que 
ahora” (economic situa-
tion in the future will be 
better) 0.599 0.49 0.527 0.499 0.628 0.483 0.562 0.496
Ha ido buscar por 
iniciatica propia ayuda a 
una institución” (looked 
for help out of own 
initiative) 0.428 0.495 0.216 0.412 0.448 0.497 0.212 0.408
Aware of public pro-
grams in the community 0.543 0.498 0.481 0.5 0.529 0.499 0.493 0.5
Satisfaction with life in-
dex: good or very good 0.718 0.45 0.783 0.412 0.736 0.441 0.814 0.389
Note: Own calculation from the longitudinal sample Encuesta Panel 2004. Variables are weighted 
using sampling weights.
  The subjective welfare questions (first 3 lines) were administered only to the head and his/
her spouse, only when present.Alleviating extreme poverty in Chile… / Emanuela Galasso 113
FIGURE 1
















Note: Own calculations: sample of all households with information on their CAS score (panel 
2003-2004).
FIGURE 2
SUPPORT OF THE CAS DISTRIBUTION
































Note: Own calculations from the panel sample 2003-04. Sample of all households with information 
on their CAS score. Vertical lines represents the ranges of the municipal (dashed) and regional 
(solid) cutoff scores.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 114
5.  Results
5.1.  Income and employment effects
Results on the income and employment dimension are reported in Table 2, 
using the estimated program effects on the CAS score, separately by urban and 
rural and by year. For each outcome of interest, outcomes are based on matching 
on the CAS score, unconditionally, conditionally on a large set of household 
characteristics10, and finally conditioning on both household characteristics as 
well as on municipality fixed effects.
Income effects: The short impact of the program on total income and labor 
income is overall small and mainly non significant across alternative specifica-
tions. Participating households have a ‘preferential access’ to public transfers 
such as the family allowance (SUF, Subsidio Unico Familiar), the old age and 
disability pension (PASIS) and the potable water subsidy (SAP). The results 
in Table 2 suggest that households in Chile Solidario are more likely to have 
received the SUF, especially in urban areas, but less likely to be receiving the 
water subsidy, the old-age pension and another form of family allowance (in 
urban areas). The negative sign cannot be interpreted as a negative impact. These 
programs are assigned strictly on the basis of the within commune ranking of the 
CAS score among the applicant households. The fact that we observe negative 
effects might simply reflect the fact that participating households lagged behind 
in activating their demand even before the program (which is not controlled for 
by the observed covariates), and that Chile Solidario did not help bridge such 
differences in take-up for such programs.
Labor Supply effects: Chile Solidario households exhibit very strong take-up 
of labor market programs: they are more likely to be participating to programs 
aimed at supporting self-employed and more likely to be participating to public 
employment/labor re-insertion and training programs. Participation rates increase 
by around 30 percentage points in urban areas, and about 14 percentage points 
in rural areas for self-employment programs. The same pattern is observed for 
public employment program (increased by about 6% points in urban areas, and 
4% points in rural areas), while the effect on take-up training programs is sig-
nificant only in urban areas. There is also a very strong effect in increasing the 
likelihood of household members to be enrolled in the local employment office 
(OMIL), one of the minimum conditions previewed by the Chile Solidario pro-
gram for unemployed members. Being enrolled in such offices not only should 
facilitate the process of looking for a job, but also represents a pre-condition 
for eligibility to various public training programs.
While the program activated a significant take-up on programs that might 
increase the employment prospects for the participating households in the medium 
term, the results do not translate into current gains in their labor supply. There 
10  Namely, family composition, age, sex marital status and education of the head of the 
household, presence/age of the spouse, indicators for ethnic minority and indicators of 
basic asset ownership.Alleviating extreme poverty in Chile… / Emanuela Galasso 115
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Note: Matching estimator: matching on the CAS score, with replacement. 3 nearest neighbors. 
Standard errors in parentheses based on the estimated variance of the sample average treat-
ment effect (as in Abadie and Imbens (2006)).
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
  Household characteristics include: household size and composition (share of males and fe-
males 0-, 6-17, 18-64, older than 65 is the excluded category), whether both head and spouse 
are in the household, sex, age, marital status and education dummies of the head, age spouse, 
whether the household is an ethnic minority, ownership of durables (refrigerator, calefont).
Table 2 (cont.)
Matching on CAS
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is no sign of improvements of the share of members who are employed, nor on 
the share of members who have a stable employment (self-reported). The only 
positive and significant effects on labor force participation are observed in rural 
areas, with gains in the share of members who are active.
On the one hand, the inconclusive evidence leaves pending important ques-
tions on the ability of the program in helping households achieve a sustained exit 
from extreme poverty. qualitative work11 clearly suggests that improvements in 
employment (especially those related to having a stable source of income in the 
household) and housing are among the most important aspirations of participating 
families and those conditions that are perceived as structural factors preventing 
households to escape extreme poverty. In this light, they are also perceived as 
the most difficult minimal conditions to meet.
On the other hand, the short term horizon of the current analysis might not 
be sufficient to observe any impact along these dimensions. In principle, the 
employment and earnings trajectories of those households who have participated 
to self-employment/public works/training programs and/or those members who 
had adult literacy program might improve in the medium run. This short term 
effects are potentially consistent with the logic of the program to satisfy some 
basic needs in the short term, while at the same time building the assets to allow 
households to improve their welfare in a sustained way in the medium-long run. 
However, the evidence on the effectiveness of active labor market program in 
North American and European studies is mixed, with modest impact on increasing 
employment rates, though not much impact on earnings (Heckman, LaLonde 
and Smith (1999)). If any, the literature shows that some of the estimated gains 
are not sustained over time when longer follow-up data are available.
5.2.  Housing effects
Having their own house (‘casa propia’) and improving its basic infrastructure 
also feature as a very important dimension among the aspirations of participat-
ing families (Asesorías para el Desarrollo (2005), Universidad de Chile (2004b, 
c), FOSIS (2004b).12 Owning a house reinforces the identity of the household 
as an independent unit and represents a capital that can be bequeathed to their 
children, together with the investment in human capital. Besides the ownership 
status, basic sanitary and housing infrastructure are important correlates of 
household welfare (FOSIS (2004a)): having basic infrastructure has potential 
complementarities with health outcomes (access to safe water and sanitation) 
as well as family dynamics (in terms of a space that allows for better roles and 
interactions among different household members).
The results in Table 2 show significant effects on the enrollment in hous-
ing programs in urban areas. The estimated effect ranges from 7% in 2003 
11  See footnote 6.
12  Textual analysis of the ‘life projects’ of those households exiting the two-years period 
of psycho-social support (ficha final Puente) also confirms that the modal combination 
of words in the aspirations of the participating households relates to ‘having their own 
house’, as well ‘improving their own house’ (Silva’s presentation at MIDEPLAN, October 
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to double to 14% in 2004. Compared to an average take-up of 24% of non-
participants (stable over time), this amounts to an estimated sizable increase 
ranging between 30 to 60%. Enrolment in such public programs requires that the 
households have set some minimum amount of savings to be eligible. Possibly 
the cash received through public transfers (either though the ‘bono’ or through 
the Subsidio Unico Familiar) has allowed the participating households to save 
towards this objective.
Housing is one of the dimensions along which there might have been some 
rationing of the supply side. The results with municipality fixed effects, which 
control for time-invariant differences in the initial availability of housing, seem 
to rule out the rationing explanation. The results with community effects do 
not differ significantly from the other specifications within areas (rural/urban), 
(though it might still be possible that the rationing applies uniformly to all 
rural areas).
Table 2 also shows significant effects of the program on the receipt of basic 
housing equipment (of about 23 percentage points) as well as basic material 
to protect the house from rain/cold (ranging from 10-15 percentage points). 
These results are also robust to controlling for community effects. Overall, the 
results provide evidence that participating households are more likely to activate 
themselves to connect to the social protection network to bridge the initial gaps 
in their housing situation.
5.3.  Impact on human capital outcomes
Table 3 reports all the results that relate to various dimensions of health and 
education. The choice of the outcomes of interest follows the list of intermediate 
indicators that are set by the program as minimum conditions to be achieved 
by participating households and that can be measured in the CASEN survey. 
All variables are computed as averages of individual outcomes at the household 
level (independently of whether the condition apply to specific subgroups of 
households or not), having in mind the objective to obtain an average effect of 
the program on the overall population of participating households. The only 
exception is given by outcomes that refer to households with disabled members, 
for whom the baseline characteristics and the expected behavioral response are 
expected to be substantially different.
Education effects: Overall, the results suggest significant and consistent increases 
in the likelihood of having all children aged 4-5 year olds enrolled in a pre-school. 
The effects for pre-school enrolment are in the range of 4-6 percentage points, 
consistently found in both urban and rural areas, as well as across different 
methods. Availability of preschools or financial constraints are not perceived 
to be an issue: cultural perceptions that the child is too young, or that he/she is 
better off taken care at home account for 90% of the self-reported reasons for 
non-enrolment (MIDEPLAN, analysis of CASEN 2003). On the supply side, 
there are different pre-school programs that have been adapted to reach the target 
population by providing free access as well as flexible hours to meet the needs 
of working mothers, even with temporary jobs or households where the head of 
the household is unemployed and the mother is looking for work.Alleviating extreme poverty in Chile… / Emanuela Galasso 119
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Sample size 3270 3270
Note: Panel Sample 2003-2004. Columns (1-3): Matching on the CAS score, with replacement, 3 
nearest neighbors. See footnote on Table 2 for more details.
  Columns (4-5): Reported coefficients (Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses) from 
a regression of the outcome variable on an indicator of participation and a cubic polynomial 
in the CAS score.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 120
School enrolment of children from 6 to 15 has mildly improved (with es-
timates ranging between 7-9%), although the results are not robust across all 
matching specifications. Household in urban areas are also more likely to have 
taken-up complementary programs of school materials, meals, and dental care 
directed to subsidize direct costs of schooling for households with lower socio-
economic conditions. There are no fees for public schools in Chile, so most of 
costs of enrolment are indirect (opportunity cost of the child’s time). There are 
no significant differences in terms of literacy of children aged 12-18.
As part of its comprehensive strategy, the program also targets illiterate adults 
or adults that would like to complete their elementary middle school levels. On 
the benefit side, literacy or improvements in the educational attainment can 
increase the adults’ self-esteem, and help process information about services/
jobs and be instrumental to supporting the children in their educational learn-
ing. The costs of participation are not only measured in terms of opportunity 
cost of their leisure time after work, but also in terms of psychological costs. In 
this respect, the psycho-social support by the social worker is instrumental to 
discuss the potential benefits of such programs, and to encourage the potential 
participants to feel motivated and capable of attaining such an objective. The 
results show a statistically significant take-up of adult literacy and education 
completion programs of around 4% in urban areas and 5 percentage points in 
rural areas.
Health effects: The impact of the program on health outcomes is more muted 
than the one on educational outcomes. The only consistent result is that par-
ticipating households are more likely to be enrolled in the public health system 
(SAPS) (2-3% in urban areas, 3% in rural areas). The impact on health visits for 
preventive care is found on some subgroups (for health visits for children below 
six years of age of the order of 4-6 percentage points, only in rural areas, and 
for women aged 35 or older for their pap smear of the order of 6-7%, mostly in 
2004 for rural areas and in 2003 in urban areas). The results on elderly are not 
significant in urban areas and often negative in rural areas. We believe that the 
negative effects are more of a reflection of the differences in the composition 
of the elderly population in our sample and of the lack of sufficient covariates 
that are specific to this age group13 rather than credible negative estimates of 
impact.
5.4.  Evidence on perceptions and orientation towards the future
The 2004 questionnaire includes some basic perception questions admin-
istered to the head of the household and/or her spouse. Although some of the 
differences might be capturing underlying differences in personality traits and 
personal attitudes and preferences, we assume that the distribution of these un-
observed characteristics is uniformly distributed across households with similar 
socio-economic characteristics and is unrelated to program participation under 
our identification assumptions.
13  Namely we control for the share of male and female elderly in the households but fail to 
account for their initial differences in health status. Alleviating extreme poverty in Chile… / Emanuela Galasso 121
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Note: Panel Sample 2003-2004. Columns (1-3): Matching on the CAS score, with replacement, 3 
nearest neighbors. See footnote on Table 2 for more details on the set of covariates.
Results are presented in Table 4. Households in Chile Solidario are more 
likely to be aware of social services in the community (10 percentage points 
in rural areas and 13-16 percentage points in urban areas, corresponding to an 
increase of the order of 20-30% relative to the non-participants). This result is in 
line with the main objectives of bridging the demand gap. Households in urban 
areas are also reporting to be more likely to proactively look for help from local 
institutions (7 percentage points).Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 122
Finally, households seem to be more optimistic about their future socio-
economic status (7-8 percentage points in rural areas and 10-11 percentage 
points in urban areas, corresponding to an increase of about 15-20% relative to 
non-participation). This improved outlook, even if it is measured with a basic 
perception question, is likely to be correlated with their orientation towards the 
future, and their willingness to invest in assets that improve their likelihood to 
eventually escape extreme poverty over time.
6.  Conclusions
This paper provides estimates of the short run effects of Chile Solidario on 
a large array of household outcomes. The results focus on the first two cohorts 
of participants, where most of the beneficiaries are still under the psychoso-
cial support of the social worker assigned to them. The main results show a 
significant and substantial effect on the take-up of cash assistance and social 
services, which was one of the main objectives of the program in its incep-
tion. The rationale for the intervention was that households in extreme poverty 
were previously observed to be disconnected from the public network of social 
services, and the program seemed to have bridged part of this gap. Second, we 
find that the program, in its two first years of operations, improves educational 
and some health outcomes of the participating households, though there are no 
effects on labor supply or income. Finally, we describe suggestive evidence that 
the psycho-social support was an important factor in enabling this change, by 
increasing awareness of social services in the community as well as households’ 
orientation towards the future.
The comparison with other conditional transfers programs comes naturally 
to mind, though it should be exercised with extreme caution. The scope of the 
program (reaching 5% of the population), the institutional strength of local 
municipalities and the vast array of social services available in Chile makes it 
hard to extrapolate the results to other countries in the Latin American region. 
Nonetheless, the methodological approach that works jointly on the demand 
and supply side of social services is an innovation with respect to traditional 
conditional cash transfers and has already attracted attention from other coun-
tries in Central America (such as Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia). Both 
types of approaches show gains in human capital indicators with increased 
health and education visits. Gertler et al (2005) provide preliminary evidence 
that some of the substantial cash transfer received by Mexican families in the 
context of Progresa (now Oportunidades) has been saved and used to finance 
in micro-enterprise activities and increased investments in farm assets and 
agricultural activities.
In the case of Chile Solidario, future analysis beyond the short term will 
provide important insights as of whether the income and employment gains are 
going to be achieved through a different strategy of intervention. In the medium 
term, the program aims at removing structural bottlenecks by strengthening 
the human capital of adults and expanding their employment opportunities and 
productive activities (via education completion/training/public employment 
or self-employment programs). This expansion of opportunities through this 
second component is deemed essential to help sustain the participants exit from Alleviating extreme poverty in Chile… / Emanuela Galasso 123
extreme poverty. The program impact on poverty may take time to materialize, 
and exit from extreme poverty, when achieved, may or may not be sustained 
over time. Furthermore, participating households that have been ‘linked’ to 
the supply side of social services (‘red local de proteccion social’) though the 
program are expected to access the ‘red’ independently in the future when faced 
by idiosyncratic shocks. The program over time has become a building block of 
the social protection system for the poor. It will be important to document its 
effectiveness to prevent households from falling back into poverty when faced 
by uninsured risk.
Finally, one of the crucial innovations of the program is to bring the psychologi-
cal dimension at the center of a large scale poverty intervention. The paramount 
importance of the psycho-social support, well documented in beneficiaries’ as-
sessments and in the qualitative work, has been only touched upon in the current 
analysis by looking at a few isolated perception questions. There is scope for 
improving our understanding on such important dimensions by enriching the 
quality of instruments for measurement and study how gains in the psychological 
dimension correlate with changes in socio-economic conditions.
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A1.  Structure of the longitudinal panel 2003-2004
A2.  Construction of the panel sample 2003-2004
The objective of the panel survey was to follow up over time only a sample 
of the CS beneficiaries and their matched comparison group. The selected 
longitudinal sample was composed of about 3,400 participating households 
(comprising of 60% of the beneficiaries interviewed in the CASEN 2003, and 
of 186 new beneficiaries of the 2004 cohort identified by cross-checking the 
administrative list of beneficiaries and with the names/addresses of the original 
CASEN).
The matched comparison group was constructed by estimating a propensity 
score of participation into the program separately for four broad geographic 
areas.14
The list of covariates included household size and age composition, whether 
the household belongs to an ethnic minority or speaks a minority language, head 
characteristics (age dummies, education dummies, marital status dummies, 
14  The four geographic areas selected by Mideplan are: regions I-IV, regions V-VII and XIII, 
regions VIII-X, regions XI-XII. Alleviating extreme poverty in Chile… / Emanuela Galasso 127
labor force history in 2000), housing characteristics, asset indicators, household 
non-labor income per capita, a rural indicator and dummies for the regions, and 
interactions between housing indicators and rural.
The matching was done among households who reported having filled in 
a ficha CAS. The prediction of the propensity score and the balancing of the 
covariates performed better than in the case where the comparison group was 
drawn from all the households sampled in the CASEN).
The matching was done choosing the 3 nearest neighbors for each beneficiary 
within each geographic area. Matching was done with replacement, based on 
the log of the odds ratios15 and imposing a common support in the propensity 
score among both beneficiaries and non-participants.
Comparison households were forced to be chosen within the same geo-
graphic area and zone (rural/urban) for practical convenience. The final sample 
of original non-participants selected by MIDEPLAN for the panel includes 
9,500 households.
15  Heckman and Todd (1995) show that in the case of sampling situations where program 
participants are oversampled (choice-based sampled data), matching can still be applied 
when matching is done on the odds ratio rather than on the propensity score. Matching 
on p/(1-p), the odds ratios, which are a monotonic transformation of the propensity score 
p, overcomes the problem of over-sampling.Evaluating the Chile… / F. Hoces de la Guardia, A. Hojman, O. Larrañaga 129 Estudios de Economía. Vol. 38 - Nº 1, Junio 2011. Págs. 129-168
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Evaluating the Chile Solidario program: results using the 
Chile Solidario panel and the administrative databases*
Evaluando el programa Chile Solidario: resultados usando el panel
Chile Solidario y datos administrativos
Fernando Hoces de la Guardia**
Andrés Hojman***, Osvaldo Larrañaga****
Abstract
This paper presents the results of a three-year evaluation performed on the first 
cohorts of Chile Solidario, the most important anti-poverty program in Chile. 
The paper presents a description of the program, emphasizing the mechanism 
by which people were admitted into the program. We then propose evaluation 
strategies and discuss their validity. The final evaluation is conducted using a 
Matching estimator, and we discuss the principles surrounding the potential for 
this to be a valid evaluation method. The initial results using the Chile Solidario 
Panel suggest that the program had positive effects on psychosocial welfare 
and on take-up of subsidies and social programs. However, it is not possible to 
obtain reliable results due to data shortcomings, particularly the lack of baseline 
data. In order to solve the problem, we generated a database using six years 
of administrative data, including around 1,000,000 family records per year. 
A method for overcoming the treatment substitution problem is discussed and 
implemented. Results are much more robust than those of the Chile Solidario 
Panel and show small, but clearly positive effects for several variables, especially 
the number of workers in the family, the percentage of workers in the family and 
the employment of the head of the family.
Key words: Matching, Extreme poverty, Impact evaluation, Treatment substi-
tution, Administrative data.